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ABSTRACT: Health care payers in the United States and abroad have used wellness incentives 
as a tool to improve health and reduce costs. In Germany, public insurers operate many such 
programs. Participation nearly doubled between 2004 and 2008, reaching one-quarter of the 
publicly insured population. An evaluation of one large wellness program there found that it 
reduced costs. However, population-level survey data also suggest that individuals with low 
incomes or poor health are less likely to enroll. In the United States, the Affordable Care Act 
raised the maximum allowed size of wellness incentives, which could lead to wide differences 
in insurance premiums between users and nonusers of programs, and may risk reintroducing 
a form of medical underwriting. The German experience confirms the cost-saving potential 
of programs, but also suggests that they should be evaluated rigorously to ensure they do not 
disadvantage those with health problems or low incomes.
                    
BACKGROUND
In the United States, Germany, and many other Western countries, rates of chronic 
diseases and obesity are on the rise among adults and children. While many factors 
contribute to this trend, social determinants play an important role, which means 
that people with low incomes typically have worse health than those with higher 
incomes.1 For this reason, public health interventions focused on vulnerable groups 
are urgently needed. In addition to such efforts, many nations have begun to explore 
the potential of health promotion efforts focused on individuals. Health or “wellness” 
incentives, which reward individuals for participating in wellness programs or for 
meeting health targets, have the potential to improve health and achieve savings.2 In 
the United States, such wellness programs have been gaining momentum, with more 
than half of all large employers offering them to their employees.3 Provisions in the 
Affordable Care Act expand the permitted scope of wellness incentives.4
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In Germany, the German Social Security Code 
allows public insurers, known as sickness funds, to offer 
their members bonuses to participate in health promo-
tion, screening, and checkup programs. Participation 
is voluntary and all major sickness funds offer a wide 
range of programs and actively promote them to their 
members. These wellness programs typically require par-
ticipants to register and have health care professionals 
or others document the performance of certain actions 
or the achievement of goals, such as receiving an influ-
enza vaccination, meeting Body Mass Index targets, or 
exercising in a gym for a certain number of times per 
week. Incentives may be offered in cash, as reductions 
of insurance contributions, or as rewards such as sports 
equipment.
These bonuses must be funded through gain-
sharing resulting from savings attributable to the reduced 
health care costs of those who participate in wellness 
programs, rather than through general insurance con-
tributions. This means that the incentives must not be 
funded through direct cost-shifting from healthy to 
unhealthy insures—for example, by increasing contribu-
tions for all those who do not enroll in the programs 
or who enroll but fail to meet the required standards. 
Sickness funds must report regularly (at least every three 
years) to the relevant authority on the savings from the 
wellness programs. Bonuses may be paid only if there are 
savings attributable to the wellness programs.
In this brief, we present data resulting from a pre-
viously published evaluation of wellness programs run 
by one of Germany’s largest sickness funds, the Barmer 
Ersatzkasse, which insures about 9 percent of the popu-
lation.5 Next, we draw on a new analysis of survey data 
to explore participation of different patient groups in 
Germany’s wellness programs. Finally, we discuss the 
expansion of wellness incentives under the Affordable 
Germany’s Sickness Funds and “Co-Responsibility” for Health
Similar to many other European countries, Germany has a statutory health insurance system providing universal 
coverage.6 Around 90 percent of the population is covered by public insurance, with the remainder purchasing 
private coverage. Public health insurance is provided by competing “sickness funds,” with Germans choosing from 
among 150 different funds. Individuals’ contributions to their sickness fund may not exceed 15.5 percent of their 
gross earnings. Prior to 2010, contributions were split equally between employers and employees, but reforms in 
2010 froze employers’ contributions at 7.3 percent and mandated that all future increases be met by employees. 
Contributions are made from pretax earnings and capped at an annual gross salary of $64,000. Contributions 
for unemployed individuals are made by the government. Copayments may be required for prescription medicines, 
physician visits, and hospitalizations, although there are limits on the maximum contribution.
The core principles governing the sickness funds, specified in the Social Security Code, identify the funds’ 
responsibility to provide health care services to their enrollees and citizens’ “co-responsibility” for their own 
health. Accordingly, citizens are expected to “lead a health-conscious lifestyle, take part in preventative measures 
[and] play an active role in treatment and rehabilitation [in order to] avoid sickness and disability, and to overcome 
the respective consequences.” Subsequent articles set out a range of provisions through which sickness funds 
may implement this approach, including financial incentives to individuals who display what is judged to be appro-
priate health-conscious behavior. Such incentives can potentially benefit sickness funds if they improve the health 
of their enrollees, since reducing or controlling costs gives funds a competitive advantage. Additionally, like loyalty 
schemes such as frequent-flyer programs or store reward cards, wellness programs can help sickness funds to 
interest and retain particularly desirable members. Since members’ contributions are income-tested, offering 
rewards that appeal to people with high incomes and low morbidity can enable sickness funds to attract the most 
profitable enrollees.7
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Care Act and draw lessons from the German experi-
ence about the potential benefits and pitfalls of these 
programs.
EVALUATION OF A GERMAN WELLNESS 
PROGRAM
The Barmer Ersatzkasse (BEK) wellness program was one 
of the first to be offered in Germany, with more than 25 
reward-eligible prevention activities including immuni-
zations, chronic condition checkups, cancer screenings, 
and exercise programs. Members who voluntarily elect to 
participate in the program are issued a “Bonus Card” that 
tracks the points they earn per intervention. They can 
redeem the points for in-kind bonuses such as one-year 
access to a Web-based electronic health record, sports 
bags, bicycle helmets, a Nintendo Wii Fit console, or 
partial funding of a short wellness vacation. Alternatively, 
they can choose an annual cash benefit up to €30 
(US$42).
In a cohort study, differences in health care 
costs between participants in the wellness program and 
nonparticipants were calculated between January 1, 
2004, and December 31, 2006 (nonparticipants were 
matched with participants according to sex, age, postal 
code, insurance status, and health care costs in order 
to act as controls). Costs were categorized as hospital 
spending, medication spending, and additional benefits. 
Ambulatory physician spending could not be included 
in the analysis, though the additional benefits category 
includes physical and occupational therapy. To examine 
whether there were differences across groups with dif-
ferent health care usage (as a proxy for health status), a 
subgroup analysis was performed comparing the costs 
of participants and nonparticipants with no health care 
utilization in the year prior to the beginning of the study 
(see Methodology for further details.) 
By 2006, the study found that participants in 
the wellness programs had significantly lower costs than 
nonparticipants (Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2). The mean dif-
ference for the sum of all three cost categories between 
the two groups amounted to €177 (US$251) savings per 
person enrolled in the wellness program per year. If pro-
gram costs were taken into account, overall savings were 
reduced to €101 (US$143). However, program participa-
tion did not result in lower health care costs for all enroll-
ees. The subgroup analysis of those participants and non-
participants who had no health care costs in 2003 found 
differences in all three areas of spending, with those 
participating in the wellness program having significantly 
higher costs overall (Exhibit 3). Despite the higher costs 
compared with the nonparticipants in this subgroup, 
these participants’ costs were lower than the mean costs 
across the overall intervention and control groups.
WHO USES WELLNESS PROGRAMS?
In a separate study, we analyzed data from the 
Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor, a survey 
of around 1,500 respondents from a nationally repre-
sentative panel, to better understand who uses wellness 
programs in Germany. For each year between 2004 and 
2008, we conducted multivariate logistic regression anal-
yses to determine whether people with low household 
income or those in poor health were less likely to partici-
pate in wellness programs, and whether this association 
changed over time (see Methodology for further details.)
Between 2004 and 2008, the proportion of survey 
respondents participating in a wellness program increased 
overall from 13 percent to 25 percent. In 2004, people 
in the lowest income group were the most likely to par-
ticipate, while those in the highest income group were 
the least likely (Exhibit 4). Between 2004 and 2008 par-
ticipation rates doubled for middle- and higher income 
groups but remained relatively unchanged for the low-
est income group. As a result, by 2008 middle-income 
groups had the highest participation rates in wellness 
programs, and lowest and highest income groups had the 
lowest rates.
The survey asked respondents to report their 
general health status. In 2004, participation rates were 
similar across the health spectrum, from those in “bad” 
health to those in “very good” health, with slightly 
higher participation rates for respondents in “excellent” 
health (Exhibit 5). Between 2004 and 2008, participa-
tion rates doubled among people in “fair” to “very good” 
health, but remained relatively unchanged for those at 
the extremes of health status (“bad” or “excellent”).8 As a 
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Exhibit 1. Mean Health Care Costs in 2003 Among Wellness Program Participants and Control Group
Note: Intervention n = 70,429 and Control n = 70,429.
* Other medical benets include massage, physiotherapy, walking aides, etc.
** The amount of €177/US$251 mentioned in the text reects the difference in the average individual increase in cost in each cohort between baseline and the end 
of the study. This sum therefore differs from the aggregate of the three cost categories summarized here.
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor, 2004–2008.
Dollars
0
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Exhibit 2. Mean Health Care Costs in 2006 Among Wellness Program Participants and Control Group
Note: Intervention n = 70,429 and Control n = 70,429.
* Other medical benets include massage, physiotherapy, walking aides, etc.
** The amount of €177/US$251 mentioned in the text reects the difference in the average individual increase in cost in each cohort between 
baseline and the end of the study. This sum therefore differs from the aggregate of the three cost categories summarized here.
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor, 2004–2008.
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Exhibit 3. Mean Health Care Costs in 2006 Among Wellness Program Participants and Control Group
Who Had No Health Care Costs in 2003
Note: Intervention n = 4,822 and Control n = 4,822.
* Other medical benets include massage, physiotherapy, walking aides, etc.
** The amount of €177/US$251 mentioned in the text reects the difference in the average individual increase in cost in each cohort between 
baseline and the end of the study. This sum therefore differs from the aggregate of the three cost categories summarized here.
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor, 2004–2008.
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result, by 2008 people in bad health were the least likely 
to participate in a wellness program.
Multivariate regression models including health, 
age, and socioeconomic indicators found no character-
istics to be significantly associated with participation in 
wellness programs in 2004. By 2008, however, respon-
dents with a chronic condition were significantly less 
likely to participate, as were men.9 Respondents from 
the lowest- and highest-income households also were less 
likely to participate, though the differences were not sta-
tistically significant (see Appendix).
DISCUSSION
The three main goals of German wellness programs are 
to improve population health, reduce—or at least curb 
increases in—health care costs, and promote competi-
tion between different sickness funds.10 Data from the 
BEK evaluation suggest that wellness programs have the 
potential to reduce health care expenditures by around 
$140 per member per year, and evaluations of other sick-
ness funds identify similar, if somewhat higher, return-
on-investment ratios.11 Somewhat surprisingly, the BEK 
data also show that a subgroup of program participants 
Exhibit 4. Wellness Program Participation, by Income, 2004–2008
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor, 2004–2008.
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Exhibit 5. Wellness Program Participation, by Health Status, 2004–2008
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor, 2004–2008.
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who had no health care costs at baseline had significantly 
higher costs by 2006, compared with those who did not 
participate and also had no health care costs at baseline. 
The reasons for this are not clear, though there are several 
possible explanations. This subgroup of program par-
ticipants may have been less healthy than their matched 
controls. The additional physician contacts prompted 
by their participation in the wellness program may have 
led to higher health care utilization, or to detection of a 
disease that was adequately treated and generated modest 
short-term costs, which might avoid much higher costs 
arising from later diagnosis and treatment. The finding 
nevertheless challenges the assumption that wellness pro-
grams will lead to cost savings in all cases. It also shows 
that requiring programs to achieve cost reductions is 
problematic: it may be undesirable to terminate programs 
that lead to behavior change simply because they fail to 
reduce expenditures.
The analysis of survey data found that over-
all participation in wellness programs nearly doubled 
between 2004 and 2008, to one-quarter of the insured 
population. While participation also doubled among the 
subgroup of those with fair health, participation rates 
among those who described their health as bad stayed the 
same. By 2008, those with chronic conditions were sig-
nificantly less likely to participate. From 2004 to 2008, 
uptake remained relatively unchanged among the lowest 
income group. The German Social Security Code explic-
itly requires sickness funds to help reduce socially deter-
mined disparities in health. Insofar as wellness programs 
prove to be effective in improving health outcomes, then 
the relatively low participation rates in such programs 
by lower-income groups and the chronically ill could 
have the opposite effect by exacerbating health dispari-
ties. Regrettably, the reporting requirements for sickness 
funds do not extend to income and health status, and 
it is therefore not possible for the relevant authorities to 
assess whether the findings suggested by the Bertelsmann 
data are also reflected in the evaluation data generated by 
the individual sickness funds. More comprehensive and 
systematic evaluation could help ensure that future pro-
grams are designed to give all population groups an equal 
opportunity to benefit.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. HEALTH REFORM
In the United States, wellness programs have been 
broadly used since 2006. A recent survey by the National 
Business Group on Health found that 56 percent of large 
employers see wellness programs as one of the top three 
means of curbing health insurance costs.12 In 2009, 36 
percent of large employers offered such programs; by 
2011, 54 percent offered them and 80 percent planned to 
do so in 2012. In 2009, 8 percent of large employers used 
incentives in the form of penalties, such as surcharges for 
smokers. In 2011, 19 percent of employers used penal-
ties and in 2012, 38 percent planned to impose higher 
costs on unhealthy employees. This increase represents a 
doubling over one year, and nearly a fivefold increase over 
three years.13
The Affordable Care Act added momentum to 
the use of wellness programs by significantly expanding 
their potential scope. Starting in 2014, the levels of reim-
bursement that may be offered as incentives will increase 
from the previous 20 percent of the cost of coverage to 
30 percent and, subject to approval from the relevant 
departments, may be as high as 50 percent.14 Notably, 
and in contrast to the German approach, where incen-
tives may only be paid through gain-sharing resulting 
from savings due to wellness program participation, pro-
grams in the United States are allowed to shift costs from 
those enrolled in the programs to those not enrolled. 
This means that health plan members who are unwill-
ing to join wellness programs, or who join them but 
are unable to meet health targets, may face significantly 
higher health care costs. In German wellness programs, 
those in poorer health and/or with lower incomes may be 
less likely to secure a relatively modest benefit (as well-
ness incentive amounts rarely exceed around US$150). 
In U.S. wellness programs, much larger sums are at stake: 
the average value of incentives provided to employees 
was $430 in 2010.15 Under the new provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act, the incentives may be much higher. 
For example, 30 percent of the average cost of coverage 
in 2011 amounts to $1,620 (Exhibit 6). Such an incen-
tive may be used in two different ways: it may be offered 
as a reduction to an employee’s contribution (Scenario 
A) or added to his or her health insurance premium 
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contribution as a surcharge or penalty if the employee 
does not enroll in wellness programs or fails to meet 
incentive targets (Scenario B). The latter use of penal-
ties has the potential to exacerbate existing inequalities 
in the affordability of health care—potentially making 
it harder for those with health problems to afford cover-
age. Depending on its implementation, this approach 
could reintroduce a form of medical underwriting under 
the guise of wellness incentives.16,17 Given the strong 
correlation between health and income, such penalties 
could be particularly hard on those with low incomes, 
who are more likely than those with higher incomes to be 
unhealthy and face higher health care costs.
Both the German and the U.S. approaches to 
wellness incentives attempt to promote health while 
reducing costs.18 It will be important to monitor their 
impact to ensure they do not worsen inequalities based 
on health status or income. However, while the reporting 
and evaluation requirements for the German programs 
are patchy, focusing on cost-savings only, and, notably, do 
nor require evidence on health improvement, there are no 
reporting requirements at all for U.S. wellness programs. 
Organizations such as the National Business Group on 
Health and the National Business Coalition on Health 
provide forums for members to share and develop best 
practices. The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services recently called for proposals to evaluate the 
impact of workplace health and wellness programs, and 
RAND is gathering the views of around 3,000 employers 
in response to this request.19 Such analyses should assess 
whether all of those who are offered wellness incentives 
have a fair opportunity to benefit from them, in addi-
tion to assessing their impact on health care costs and 
workplace productivity. The U.S. Department of Labor is 
developing regulations to accompany the implementation 
of the amended provisions in 2014. These regulations 
should require employers to provide data not only on 
the cost savings and productivity gains from their well-
ness programs, but also on their impact on the health of 
employees across different income groups. Such policies 
will help to ensure that wellness programs are compatible 
with the spirit of the Affordable Care Act—to provide 
access to affordable care and improve the health of all 
Americans.
Exhibit 6. Cost-Shifting in U.S. Wellness Programs— 
Legally Permissible Incentives in Relation to Average Cost of Coverage, 2011
30 percent 50 percent
If the average cost of coverage is $5,400, then the maximum permissible 
incentive is: 
$1,620 $2,700
Scenario A: Cost of coverage is reduced for the enrolled population by the 
incentive amount. The final cost of coverage is: 
$3,780 
($5,400 – $1,620)
$2,700 
($5,400 – $2,700)
Scenario B: Cost of coverage is increased for those not enrolled, and those 
failing to meet targets, by the incentive amount. The final cost of coverage is: 
$7,020 
($5,400 + $1,620)
$8,100 
($5,400 + $2,700)
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits: 2011 Annual Survey (Menlo Park, Calif., and Chicago: Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, 2011).
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Appendix. Associations Between Personal Characteristics and Uptake of Incentives;  
Results of Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis for 2004 and 2008
2004 2008
N (2008)* Odds ratio 95% CI Odds ratio 95% CI
Age 1,375 1.01 0.99–1.02 1.00 0.99–1.01
Sex: Female 752 1.21 0.81–1.82 1.66† 1.24–2.22
Chronic illness 362 1.36 0.77–2.40 0.68† 0.48–0.96
Household income (monthly)
<€1,000 112 1 — 1 —
€1,000–€1,999 427 0.84 0.42–1.67 1.87 0.99–3.50
€2,000–€2,999 416 0.72 0.34–1.50 1.57 0.82–3.03
€3,000–€3,999 200 0.68 0.28–1.67 1.31 0.64–2.69
€4,000+ 142 0.55 0.18–1.66 0.95 0.43–2.11
General health status
Bad 30 1 — 1 —
Fair 228 1.13 0.23–5.48 4.07† 1.14–14.47
Good 725 1.02 0.22–4.88 3.42 0.96–12.15
Very good 327 1.23 0.25–6.16 3.54 0.96–13.09
Excellent 60 1.43 0.24–8.63 3.20 0.73–13.90
Body Mass Index
<20.0 16 1 — 1 —
20.0–24.9 516 0.87 0.34–2.21 1.75 0.84–3.67
25.0–29.9 507 0.91 0.35–2.37 2.03 0.97–4.28
30.0–39.9 263 1.00 0.36–2.74 1.13 0.52–2.46
40.0+ 41 ** ** 1.64 0.55–4.93
Socioeconomic class
Lower 223 1 — 1 —
Middle 758 0.91 0.56–1.47 1.43 0.95–2.14
Upper 284 0.59 0.28–1.26 1.30 0.76–2.20
Notes: CI refers to confidence interval. Model pseudo R2: 2004 = 0.015; 2008 = 0.037. 
* Respondents who also answered questions on wellness incentives (1,375 respondents answered these questions in 2008, from a total sample size of 1,533). 
** Rejected from model. 
† Statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor, 2004–2008.
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Methodology
Evaluation of a German Wellness Program
In a cohort study, 70,429 insured members of the intervention group—those who were enrolled in the wellness 
program—were followed over a three-year period. Members of the intervention group were matched with insured 
members who had never enrolled in the program. Matching criteria included sex, age, postal code, insurance status, 
and cost categories for health care utilization. Exclusion criteria were new enrollment or discontinuation of enroll-
ment one year prior to the time frame of the study and during the study period. Costs were identified from routine 
administrative data available at the sickness fund level. All costs are total costs derived from health care utilization per 
insured member per year, measured in cost per insured member per year in the three categories: hospital, medication, 
and additional benefits. The latter benefits include treatment such as physical or occupational therapy and massage, 
but not outpatient physician services. Unit costs for all three resource types were derived from a national compensa-
tion system that is the same for all sickness funds and all care providers accepting sickness fund patients. The inter-
ventions analyzed incur no copayments of any kind; hence, there is no share paid by enrollees. Costs for the bonus 
payments and overhead costs were calculated separately. Total costs reported by the sickness fund included expenses 
for administration, mailing and advertisement of the program, and bonus payments. Differences in cost trends 
between the two groups were examined using the paired t-test with the significance level at alpha = 0.1. A subgroup 
analysis was performed for incentive program participants without any health care utilization in the year 2003 com-
pared with their matched controls.
Who Uses Wellness Programs?
The Bertelsmann Foundation’s Health Care Monitor is a semiannual survey that randomly samples 1,500 respon-
dents from a nationally representative access panel. The surveys include questions on demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics, in addition to a range of questions on health and health care use. Since 2004 the surveys have 
included questions on participation in wellness programs. For each year between 2004 and 2008, we conducted 
multivariate logistic regression analyses of the associations between participation in wellness programs and household 
income, self-rated health status, and a range of demographic characteristics. For methodological reasons, we did not 
weight responses. We measured the uptake of incentives by different population groups from their introduction in 
2004. More specifically, we measured: 1) whether people from higher-income households were more likely to use 
wellness programs than those from lower-income households; 2) whether people with good health status were more 
likely to use wellness programs than those with poor health status; and 3) changes in the associations between use of 
wellness programs and income and health status over time.
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